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RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondents1 petition for rehearing does not present any points 
of law which were overlooked or misunderstood by this Court. 
Respondent's complaint that this Court's decision is restrictive 
is merely an attempt to introduce new theories of the case or reargue 
old theories which were rejected at trial. 
Respondents1 claim that appellant's post-trial actions should 
form the basis of a dismissal of this appeal is without merit and 
contrary to the specific ruling of the trial court and of the Court of 
Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENTS1 PETITION FOR REHEARING DOES NOT PRESENT 
ANY PROPOSITIONS OR QUESTIONS EITHER OF LAW OR FACT WHICH 
WERE NOT FULLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT. 
The function of a Petition for Rehearing is to present to the 
court errors of law or fact or both asserted to have been made by the 
court. (L.'Abbe v. District Court 26 Colo 386 , 58 P 604) 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
in part: 
The petition shall state with particularity the 
points of law or fact which the petitioner claims 
the court has overlooked or misapprehended. 
Respondent (Bruno) argues that his allegations of theft against 
appellant (Dorothy) constitute a fact that was not fully considered by 
the court. The record shows, however, that these allegations form 
the main theory of Bruno's case. These allegations were simply not 
proven at trial. Bruno would like to reopen this theory and do what 
he failed to do at trial; namely, prove his theory. Bruno did not 
o 
appeal this issue or any other issue. This assertion has been fully 
considered by both the trial court and this court 
Bruno further argues that the trial court "determined that it 
was not necessary to make a finding as to what occurred, because the 
trial court held that the 1973 Agreement was not enforceable in any 
event" 
This statement by Bruno is a misstatement of the trial court's 
ruling. The trial court made no such finding. As a matter of fact, the 
trial court specifically recited both parties* version of the disputed 
theft and declined to make any finding whatsoever on that issuec 
Bruno cites the case of Noble v. Noble 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 
1988) as authority for his argument Noble may be easily 
distinguished. Noble involved a trial court finding of tortious conduct 
by virtue of the husband having shot the wife in the head. After 
partially recovering, the wife filed for divorce and the court awarded 
substantial separate property to the wife which had belonged to the 
husband. The clear distinction in the present case is that no finding 
was made that Bruno had even proven that a theft had occurred, let 
alone who was supposed to have committed the offense. 
Bruno continues to argue his version of the facts without 
acknowledging that, after presenting four days' worth of evidence, 
the trial court was not persuaded that Dorothy was involved in any 
way. 
Bruno next proposes that the 1973 Agreement was rescinded 
by the conduct of the parties, and that this constitutes a new fact 
which should be considered on rehearing. Again, the theory of 
rescission was at the heart of Bruno's case in the trial court. 
However, the record does not support this theory. The record does 
support the decision issued by this court that the 1973 Agreement 
was unambiguous, not entered into as a result of fraud or coercion or 
material non-disclosure, and that it should be enforced pursuant to 
its terms. Bruno attempts to retry the issue of rescission, but 
without evidence in the record to sustain his theory. 
Again this argument is based upon Bruno's allegation that 
Dorothy robbed Bruno of his records. No finding was made 
supporting this allegation and it remains as untrue as it is unproven. 
Neither the issue of an alleged theft nor the issue of conduct 
constituting a rescission constitutes law or fact which were 
overlooked or misapprehended by this court. 
Furthermore, any reference to case number 900223-CA is 
irrelevant and improper in this court. Dorothy was not a party to the 
dispute between Bruno and his son, Eric, nor was she represented by 
counsel in that case. 
II. RESPONDENTS1 COMPLAINT THAT THIS COURTS REVERSAL IS 
OVERLY RESTRICTIVE IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE NEW 
A 
THEORIES OR REARGUE OLD THEORIES WHICH WERE REJECTED AT 
TRIAL AND NOT APPEALED0 
Bruno would like this court to permit the trial court enough 
latitude to reconsider the issues of the alleged theft and rescission by 
conduct of the parties in order to defeat the clear language of the 
1973 Agreement and the intent of this court. This, the court should 
decline to do. This court's ruling is a fair and considered statement 
of the law. Bruno should not be allowed to destroy the intent of the 
1973 Agreement and this court's ruling in order to satisfy his own 
purposes. 
Bruno introduces a new theory of his case by suggesting that it 
would be acceptable to him if the court determined that the 
properties were separate and then proceeded to divide Dorothy's 
separate property with Bruno, This is an irrational attempt to 
acknowledge what cannot be denied (the validity of the 1973 
Agreement) and yet convey some or all of Dorothy's property to 
Bruno under a theory of equity. 
His argument that the property should be treated as separate 
property, but that Dorothy's property should be divided with him, is 
based upon the false premise that merely alleging theft and 
rescission, which were not proven in the case, constitutes an 
equitable reason to disregard the Agreement of the parties. This 
should not be allowed. 
This court has stated: 
. . . it is familiar doctrine that every pleader is 
is required to state the cause of action or defense 
upon which he relies; that a party in the trial 
of a cause adopting a theory of the case is 
generally bound by it, that a case must stand or 
fall upon the theory upon which the complaint 
is based, and that a party cannot take or adopt 
a position in the trial court and thereafter urge 
a different one on appeal . . . (Utah Copper Com-
pany v. District Court 91 Utah 377, 64 P.2d 241 
(1937).) 
The record shows that Bruno asserts the invalidity of the 1973 
Agreement when it suits his purpose, asserts the validity of the 1973 
Agreement when it suits his purpose, and that he now requests this 
court to grant latitude to the trial court to disregard the intent of the 
1973 Agreement and convey some or all of Dorothy's property to 
him under its general equitable powers. There is no evidence in the 
record to support the existence of unique and compelling 
circumstances which would justify disregarding an otherwise 
enforceable agreement. 
In this case, the 1973 Agreement was executed, notarized, 
recorded, deeds exchanged, and property valued at over $1,100,000 
(ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS) transferred to 
Bruno, and real estate and cash valued at over $500,000 (FIVE 
HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS) transferred to Dorothy. Thirteen 
6 
(13) years passed before Bruno filed for divorce and claimed the 
Agreement was not binding,, There is a difference between a long-
standing marital contract and a proposed stipulation that is 
submitted for approval and inclusion in a divorce decree, as set forth 
in the case of Coleman v. Coleman 743 P.2d 782 (1987). Bruno's 
reliance upon Coleman is not well-taken. The facts of Coleman do not 
apply to this case nor does the reasoning. 
I l l . RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT APPELLANTS POST-TRIAL 
ACTIONS SHOULD FORM THE BASIS OF A DISMISSAL OF THIS 
APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT AND CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFIC 
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT. 
Under the original decree of divorce Dorothy was ordered to 
pay approximately $236,800 (TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND 
AND EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS) to Bruno. This Order became moot 
when this court reversed the trial court on the issue of the validity of 
the 1973 Agreement. 
However, before ruling on the merits of this case, this court 
required Dorothy to appear and submit to court process. This she 
has done. (See Addendum Exhibit 1, page 4, line 12-15) 
In addition, Dorothy was given 45 days to purge her contempt 
by paying the foregoing sum to the courtc Dorothy explained that she 
was without any money and was caring for her cancer-ridden father. 
i 
The trial court then remarked "if the Appellate court doesn't reverse 
this thing, affirms what I have done, then I think she is in deep 
trouble,," (See Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 5, line 11) The trial court 
knew that it might be reversed and that a reversal would render the 
order of payment moot, because those funds were from Dorothy's 
separate property under the 1973 Agreement. 
The court then set a date for further hearing but qualified it as 
follows: 
I want to know the status of Mrs. D'Aston's 
father. I want her back in court unless I 
waive her coming back in . . . (Addendum, 
Exhibit 1, page 2, line 21) . . . unless there is 
some compelling reason why she can't be here. 
If her father is on his death bed or something, 
or if there's a funeral, or whatever (see Adden-
dum, page 7, line 12 - 14) 
This court has already noted that Dorothy complied with its 
requirement to appear and submit to the trial court process. Bruno's 
assertion that Dorothy did not satisfy the trial court is not supported 
by evidence of any kind. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing does not present any 
points of law or fact which were overlooked or misunderstood by 
this court. 
He proposes to produce additional evidence and adopt new 
theories in order to obtain the original result. 
In the alternative, he suggests that, because Dorothy was under 
a contempt order, based upon a misapplication of the law, that she 
should be denied her right of appeal on the merits. 
Appellant respectfully urges the court to deny the Petition for 
Rehearing and issue its remittitur to the trial court for proceedings 
consistent with the decision therein. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
o 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing Response to 
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300 North, Post Office Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603, postage prepaid, 
this go day August, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
1 1 
* * * 
1 IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTPICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
2 I STATE OF UTAH 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 I DOROTHY D'ASTON 
g J Plaintiff 
9 
) Civil No.. CV-86-1124 
vs. ORDER TRANSCRIPT 
10 
n 
12 
\l | BRUNO D'ACTON 
14 
. Defendant. 
15 | > 
16 
17 I BE IT,REMEMBERED that on Friday, the 4th day of 
18 May, 1990, the ORDER - in the above-entitled matter 
19 was taken by Richard C. Tatton/ a Certified Shorthand 
20 Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
21 before the Honorable Boyd L. Park at the Utah County 
22 J Courthouse, Provo, Utah 
23 
24 
25 
1 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For t h e P l a i n t i f f : Mr. B r i a n H a r r i s o n 
& 
Mr. Don Mullin 
Attorneys at Law 
Provo, Ut'ah 84601 
For the Defendant: Mr. S. Rex Lewis 
Attorney at Law 
Provo, Utah 84601 
THE COURT: Well what I am going to do I am goinc 
to give you 30 days to purge yourself as I indicated. Then 
at the end of 30 days Mr. Harrison I want to know what 
progress has been made in locating Lisa. I want to know 
what the status is of Mrs. D1Aston1s father. I want 
her back in court unless I waive her coming back in 
court but the jail time of 60 days will remain. I will 
review it before she is obligated to go to jail. 
2 
In order to do that I will give her 45 days 
instead of 30 days to purge herself6 
MR. HARRISON: I haA/e jotted down that it is 45 
days to pay the sum of $236,800.00. 
THE COURT: Yes and either deposit with the court 
or into a agreeable acceptable trust account. 
MR. HARRISON: Or secondly and then within that 
45 days - -
THE COURT:- If she doesn't have it within 45 
days , well if she doesn't have it within 40 days you need 
to apprise the court as to the situation of her father 
and what has been done to locate Lisa. 
MR. HARRISON: Okay. I do believe I have 
my phone number of Lisa and her boyfriend. I may 
have have the address as of the time of trial. I will 
do what I can to follow any leads. 
THE COURT: Lisa is a defendant in this action 
and as far as I am concerned she is still, the court 
still has jurisdiction over her. 
MR. HARRISON: I would note for the record it seei 
to me as the thing has unfolded obviously at one time 
I represented all three defendants. I think I am clearly 
in a conflict of interest now, 
THE COURT: Well you have already withdrew from 
representing the other two* 
3 
MR, HARRISON: Right. 
THE COURT: Be that as it may I want to see 
something concrete about Mrs, D'Aston attempting to locate 
Lisa, 
MR, HARRISON: Right, 
THE COURT: Then the court will consider 
at that time whether imposing the 60 days at that time or not. 
.1 will review the matter, 
MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, with respect to the 
Court of Appeals matter what is.the court's feeling about 
that? 
THE COURT: Well the Court of Appeals says she 
has 30 days from the day of the issuance of this opinion 
to bring herself within the process of the trial court.* 
•She had done that, 
MR. HARRISON: What I did is prepare an order 
for the court to sign that merely says that she has 
submitted herself to the process by the court pursuant 
to this order, would that refect it accurately? 
THE COURT: You and Mr. Lev/is can argue in front cj 
the Appellate Court whether or not that meets their 
requirement. 
Any objections Mr. Lewis? 
MR. LEWIS: No she has appeared I assume that she) 
is still in contempt of the court? 
4 
1 THE COURT: Yes you may add that she is in 
2 contempt of court and the court has given her an opportunity 
3 to purge herself with 45 daysc 
4 MR. LEWIS: Maybe iftterlineate that on there? 
5 THE COURT: Let's type it up and include that. 
$ MR. LEWIS: You want Mr. Harrison to do it or 
7 roe? 
8 THE COURT: Probably Mr. Harrison to do it. 
9 MR. HARRISON: What does the court want me 
10 
11 
12 
13 
20 
to add? 
THE COURT: You need to add to that that she 
is still in contempt of the court. The court has given 
her 45 days to purge that contempt after which the court 
14 I will review the matter in the event she hasn't purged 
15 herself from that. If the Appellate Court doesn't 
lg reverse this thing , affirms what I have done, then I 
17 think she is in deep trouble/ 
lg MR. LEWIS: What about preparing the order that 
19 the court has just made? 
THE COURT: Yes that order needs to be made a; 
well. 
22 I MR- LEWIS: I will prepare that 
2| THE COURT: Yes you prepare that, 
24 i MR. LEWIS: Are you going to set a date certain 
25 I to come back into court? 
1 THE COURT: I think we need to set a date certain 
2 About 40 days down the road. What have you got Diana. 
3 THE CLERK: Friday afternoon, Judge? 
4 THE COURT: That will be fine. 
5 THE CLERK: June 15th? 
g MR. HARRISON: Mot good for me about about the 
7 
13 
!4 
15 
16 
17 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
22nd? 
g THE COURT: That will be fine. 
9 I THE CLERK: 1:30. 
JQ 1 THE COURT: All right we will review it on 
!j June 22nd at 1:30. 
., J MR. HARRISON: With respect to the Bench Warrant 
I assume that the court would/then order that be withdrawn? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HARRISON: That would be included in Mr. 
Lews' order? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
jg MR. HARRISON: I also would have no objection to Mfl 
Lewis putting language in there that should Mrs. D'Aston 
change her address that she would notify the court 
within a week of her new address. 
THE COURT: Well pursuant to this decision by 
the Appellate Court I think we have jurisdiction as long as 
you are around. 
MR. HARRISON: That seems like a new law Judge 
6 
it seems to me. 
THE COURT: But I think that is your obligation 
to see that to know where yout client is at. If he wants 
to put it in the order he may. But it is your oblignti-on 
to know where your client is and how to get a hold of 
her and if the court or anybody else needs her address 
then you should furnish that. 
MR. HARRISON: Fine. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. LEWIS: Continuing it to that date and is 
the defendant to appear on that date in court? 
THE COURT: Yes unless there is some compelling 
reason why she can't be- here. If her father is on his 
death bed or something or if there is a funeral or whatever 
MR. LEWIS: The order she is to be here unless 
modified for some reason I suppose? 
THE COURT: Yes, put that in the order. 
Mrs. D'Aston I am being extremely lenient with you. Once I 
.allow this sort of thing to go on in the court's order 
to be held in contempt I don't know who else is going 
to come along and think they can do the same thing. I just| 
hope you appreciate what a difficult position you have 
put this court in when it could have been solved. I 
just do not understand why you should think you should have] 
to give all of this money to ypur daugther. Unless she has 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
n 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
had a complete change of personality or something as to 
why you would even trust her with it. That is beyond-' 
me. 
All right anything further? 
MR.HARRISON: No, ^our Honor. 
MR. LEWIS: No. 
THE COURT: Court will be inrecess. 
THE BAILIFF: Everyone please arise. Court 
will be in recess. 
(WHEREUPON, this order was concluded) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) •ss 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the ORDER TRANSCRIPT 
was reported by me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused 
by me to be transcribed into typewriting by Richard c. . 
Taton and that a full, true and correct transcription of 
said TRANSCRIPT was so taken. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action and that I am not interested in the event 
thereof. 
WITNESS my hand ancf official seal at Midway, Utat 
this //i^ day of May, 1990. 
RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR 
My commission expires: 
June 15. 1993 
'* SJrsa _ ^ « 
